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Abstract 
Several approaches have been proposed for accounting for temporary carbon 
sequestration in land-use change and forestry projects that are implemented to offset 
permanent emissions of carbon dioxide from the energy sector. In a previous paper, 
we evaluated the incentives provided by some of these approaches. In this paper, we 
investigate further what we call the “ideal” accounting system, where the forest owner 
would be paid for carbon sequestration as the service is provided and redeem 
payments when the forest is harvested and carbon is released back into the 
atmosphere. We demonstrate how discounting affects the net present value of the 
forest when carbon sequestration is taken into account under this ideal system. Not all 
carbon is released back into the atmosphere at harvest, however, since a large 
proportion may remain fixed in forest products for many years. Here, we compare the 
profitability of the forest under full redemption of credits at harvest, with partial 
redemption of credits at harvest followed by annual redemption post-harvest as the 
carbon decays in a durable forest product. The analysis is based on simulation of 
farm-forestry systems in south-eastern Australia.  
Keywords: carbon accounting, reforestation, discounting, bioeconomics 
Introduction 
Large-scale transformation of agricultural land to forests will reduce atmospheric 
carbon. Trees remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere during 
photosynthesis, store the carbon (C) in wood, leaves and roots and release the oxygen 
back into the atmosphere. However, carbon sequestered by trees is not removed from 
the atmosphere indefinitely, since trees may die, be destroyed (eg. by fire) or be 
harvested for forest products, and re-emit CO2. A major concern with the use of 
forestry and other land-use sinks for greenhouse-gas mitigation is the temporary 
nature of carbon storage in vegetation and forest products, in contrast to emission 
reductions in the energy sector which are permanent in the sense that an avoided 
emission will never reach the atmosphere. 
Several approaches have been proposed for accounting for temporary carbon 
sequestration in land-use change and forestry projects (LUCF) that are implemented 
to offset permanent emissions of carbon dioxide from the energy sector. In a previous 
paper, we describe some of these approaches and evaluate the incentives they provide 
for farm forestry (see Cacho et al., 2003). In this paper, we investigate further what 
we call the “ideal” system, where carbon-sequestration credits and debits accrue in the   2 
year in which they are incurred. This accounting system is equivalent to the “stock-
change” method that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climiate Change (IPCC) has 
agreed to use in the implementation of LUCF projects under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The model is briefly described below, and implemented for a Eucalypt forest in 
Australia. We use the model to investigate how discounting affects the profitability of 
the forest for timber as well as for carbon. This study was motivated by the analysis of 
Tomich et al. (1997) of an Acacia mangium system in South Kalimantan, Indonesia. 
In their study, Tomich et al. (1997) found that at discount rates above 15-20 percent 
(approximately the real cost of capital in that country), Acacia mangium was 
unprofitable in the absence of carbon-sequestration payments. Including carbon 
credits with full redemption at harvest increased the profitability of the system 
significantly. At discount rates above 10-15 percent, the value of carbon outweighed 
the value of timber. 
Acacia mangium is primarily a pulpwood species however, and a substantial 
proportion of the sequestered carbon will be released back into the atmosphere with 
the disposal of pulp and paper products. Consequently, the value of the sequestered 
carbon will be offset by the value of post-harvest carbon emissions. Tomich et al. 
(1997) report that if the half-life of pulp and paper products is 2.5 years, 80 percent of 
the value of the sequestered carbon will be offset by post-harvest emissions at a zero 
discount rate, and that this effect diminishes as the discount rate increases. This 
prompted us to also use our model to investigate the effect on the profitability of the 
Eucalypt forest of different debit regimes based on the rate at which carbon decays in 
forest products, for a range of discount rates. Some carbon is lost when trees are 
harvested and when raw timber is processed and converted into forest products, 
however the fate of the remaining carbon depends on its end use. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1. For example, carbon in durable forest products such as construction timber 
may be stored for decades, while carbon in less resilient products such as pulp and 
paper will be stored for far less time. In this paper, we compare the profitability of the 
forest with full payment of debits at harvest, and with partial payment of debits at 
harvest followed by annual payments post-harvest as the carbon decays in a durable 















Figure 1. Carbon stocks and flows in forestry systems. 
Carbon-accounting model 
Consider the case of a landholder evaluating the prospect of planting trees and an 
investor who is willing to pay price pb per tonne of carbon sequestered by those trees. 
The value of a forest stand at harvest in the presence of annual carbon-sequestration 
payments is:   3 
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where p(T) is the net present value of the forest harvested in year T after planting. The 
first term on the right-hand side represents the value of the timber harvest, the second 
term represents the sum of the annual payments for carbon sequestered in the interval 
(0, ...,T), cE is the forest establishment cost, pv is the price of timber which depends on 
the average stem diameter (d, cm) of the trees at harvest, and r is the discount rate. 
The state variables v(t) and b(t) are, respectively, the timber (stemwood) volume in 
cubic meters per hectare (m
3/ha), and the carbon stock in forest biomass in tonnes of 
carbon per hectare (tC/ha). The last term in equation (1), D(T), is the debit applied 
upon harvest to account for the release of CO2 into the atmosphere. With full debit 
this function is: 
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Equation (2) means that the total amount of carbon credits received during the life of 
the forest must be paid back (ie. redeemed) to the investor by the landholder at 
harvest. This implicitly assumes that the contract ends as the sequestered carbon is no 
longer under the control of the landholder. This scheme is equivalent to the rental 
carbon market proposed by Marland et al. (2001). 
Forest growth model 
The Chapman-Richards function has been shown to provide a good representation of 
growth in timber (stemwood) volume, v(t), and basal area, a(t) (Venn et al., 2000, p. 
75). So the growth of the forest stand can be represented as: 
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where the parameters q, a and b are determined by the species of tree, environmental 
conditions and forest management. Once parameterised, equation (3a) is used to 
estimate timber volume at harvest, while equation (3b) is used to estimate the average 
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where tph is the number of trees per hectare. The value of d is used to calculate the 
price received for the timber harvest: 
) ( 1 0 T d pv × + = g g   (5) 
If wood density and the proportion of carbon in stemwood biomass are known, the 
stock of carbon in stemwood biomass (w(t), tC/ha), can be estimated as:  
( ) t v t w × =d ) (   (6)   4 
where d is the carbon content per cubic meter of stemwood (tC/m
3). The ratio of 
forest biomass to stemwood biomass depends on the type of tree and its age. Young 
trees generally have more branches and foliage relative to stem than old trees. This is 
represented in the following function, derived from the model of Kirschbaum (2000): 
( ) [ ]
m m q d f
+ × × × =
1
1
) ( ) ( t w t b   (7) 
where b(t) is the total carbon stock in the standing forest biomass (tC/ha), f  and m are 
parameters determined by tree shape, and the remaining variables have been 
previously defined. Annual changes in the standing carbon stock can now be 
estimated by differencing: 
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This is the stock-change method defined by the IPCC. 
Equations (2) (3a), (5), (7) and (8) are substituted into (1) for t=T to solve the carbon-
accounting model. Only above-ground biomass carbon has been considered here; b(t) 
includes stem, branches, and foliage, but not carbon contained in the soil or roots. 
Including soil and root carbon will increase the stock of carbon that receives payment 
but will also increase the cost of measuring that carbon; this is discussed by Cacho et 
al. (2002) and is not considered further in this paper. 
Land-use scenarios and model calibration 
Tree-growth parameters for equations (3a) and (3b) are presented in Table 1 for two 
sites in south-eastern Australia. These parameters were estimated statistically based 
on values reported by Wong et al. (2000) for Eucalyptus nitens (commonly known as 
Shining Gum). Site 1 has high rainfall and Site 2 has moderate rainfall. Further details 
about the sites are presented in Cacho et al. (2003).  
Table 1. Tree parameter values used in the model, estimated from data reported by 
Wong et al. (2000).  
Parameter  Site 1  Site 2 
qv  842.87  262.96 
av  0.190  0.252 
bv  3.759  4.651 
qa  69.54  30.12 
aa  0.139  0.383 
ba  1.724  5.000 
Observed and predicted timber volumes for E. nitens for the two sites are presented in 
Figure 2. It is obvious that the growth function (3a) provides a good fit to the data, 
however data were only available for trees up to 10 years of age; this means that 
predictions regarding the steady state which is reached after year 30 are uncertain. 
However, the predicted maximum volumes (given by q in Table 1) at steady state are 
plausible (863 m
3/ha and 263 m
3/ha for sites 1 and 2 respectively).   5 
Base values for other parameters used in the numerical model are presented in Table 
2. 
The model was implemented for both Site 1 and Site 2 for the base parameter values 
presented in Tables 1 and 2, for a hypothetical project of 30 years duration (ie. T=30) 




























Figure 2. Eucalyptus nitens growth at the two sites. Predicted and observed values for 
Site 1 (solid line and dots respectively) and Site 2 (dashed line and triangles 
respectively). Data from Wong et al. (2000). 
 
Table 2. Base parameter values. 
Parameter  Value  Units  Description  Source 
g0  -4.342  $  timber price intercept  d 
g1  0.936  $/cm  timber price slope  d 
pb  20  $/tC  price of carbon  f  
Tph  250  trees/ha  tree density  e 
cE  2,300  $/ha  establishment cost  a 
d  0.378  t C /m
3  carbon content of wood  b 
f   1.429  *  biomass in mature forest 
relative to stemwood 
biomass  
c 
m  0.2  *  forest biomass parameter  c 
* unitless coefficient. 
Sources: a: Hassall and Associates (1999); b: estimated as wood density ´ C content of biomass = 0.7 
(t/m
3) ´ 0.54; c: calculated from parameters presented by Kirschbaum (2000); d: linear approximation 
to assumed data following discussions with Signor (2001, pers. comm.); e: assumed value following 
discussions with Signor (2001, pers. comm.); f: arbitrary value subject to sensitivity analysis. 
Results 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of discounting on the net present value of the project for 
both sites, with full debit at harvest. As expected, the net present value of the timber 
harvest decreases as the discount rate increases. Timber returns eventually become 
negative, this occurs at a discount rate of 10 percent for Site 1 and four percent for 
Site 2. In contrast, the net present value of carbon sequestration (the stream of annual   6 
credit payments less redemption at harvest) increases until it reaches a maximum (of 
$2166 for Site 1 and $784 for Site 2, at a discount rate of six percent) and then 
decreases as the discount rate increases further. This occurs because discounting has 
less effect on the stream of credit payments than it does on the one-off redemption 
payment at the end of the project, for discount rates up to six percent. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 4, where the value of credit payments initially decreases more 
slowly than the value of the debit payment. This effect is greatest for the higher-
quality site (Site 1) at which more carbon is sequestered. 
 






























































Figure 3. Present value of profits for Site 1 (charts A and C) and Site 2 (charts B and 
D). The top charts are total profits (solid line) and profits from timber harvest (dashed 
line), and the bottom charts are profits from carbon sequestration (solid line). 
 





































A. Site 1 B. Site 2
 
Figure 4. Present value of annual credit payments (solid line) and the one-off debit 
payment (dashed line) for Site 1 (chart A) and Site 2 (chart B). 
   7 
These results clearly demonstrate that temporary carbon sequestration has a positive 
net value when discount rates are greater than zero, and that this value increases as the 
discount rate increases up to a maximum, even when carbon payments are paid back 
in full at harvest. It is also obvious that the project is unprofitable in the absence of 
carbon-sequestration payments for both sites at even conservative discount rates (10 
percent for Site 1 and four percent for Site 2). However, even with carbon credits, the 
project remains unprofitable at discount rates above 14 percent for Site 1 and six 
percent for Site 2 (Figure 3). 
The discount rates at which NPVs become zero in Figure 3 represent internal rates of 
return for the project. These values are 10 percent and four percent for timber alone 
(IRRW), and 14 percent and six percent for timber plus carbon sequestration (IRRP), 
for Site 1 and Site 2 respectively. IRRW and IRRP form the bounds of a “critical 
interval” of discount rates. Within this interval carbon payments “swing the deal” and 
make the project profitable (NPV>0). 
The critical interval is illustrated in Figure 5, by the shaded area, which represents the 
returns from carbon sequestration. At discount rates below IRRW, the landholder will 
establish the forest for timber alone. Between IRRW and IRRP, the landholder will 
establish the forest if carbon payments are also received. Above IRRP the landholder 






































Figure 5. Present value of total profits (solid line) and profits from timber harvest 
(dashed line) for Site 1 (chart A) and Site 2 (chart B). The shaded area represents the 
critical interval where carbon payments “swing the deal”. 
 
Including carbon payments clearly increases the profitability of the project, and the 
value of carbon outweighs the value of timber at discount rates above eight percent 
for Site 1 and above four percent for Site 2. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where the 
two curves intersect. To the left of the intersection point timber is more valuable than 
carbon and this relationship is reversed to the right of the point. 
   8 







































Figure 5. Present value of profits from carbon sequestration (solid line) and timber 
harvest (dashed line) for Site 1 (chart A) and Site 2 (chart B). 
 
Analysis of post-harvest emissions 
Carbon decay in forest products can be described by its half-life, which is the time 
required for one-half of the carbon to decay before being released back into the 
atmosphere as CO2. 
Below, carbon in forest products is assumed to be released back into the atmosphere 
after harvest, based on a half-life of H years. Some carbon is lost in the process of 
harvesting and converting trees into forest products (recovery). The carbon stock 
remaining in forest products at a given point in time (f(t), tC/ha) is given by: 
( )
( ) T t for T t
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And the debit function (2) becomes: 
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where N is a suitably long planning horizon to account for the life of forest products 
(in this analysis assumed to be 30 years). This equation is substituted into (1) to obtain 
the results presented in Table 3. The recovery (R) is assumed to be 0.5, and a half-life 
(H) of 50 years is used for illustration. Some debits are therefore paid up-front at 
harvest, while the remainder are paid annually post-harvest as the carbon decays in 
the forest product (ie. the redemption period is extended). In Table 3 this scenario is 
compared with the results under full debit at harvest from the previous section, which 
equates to a half-life of zero. 
 
The value of carbon redemption is significantly lower when the half-life is longer 
(Table 3). This occurs because post-harvest debit payments are delayed and therefore 
more heavily discounted. This effect is greater for the higher-quality site (Site 1) at 
which more carbon is sequestered. The value of carbon redemption offsets the value 
of sequestered carbon (ie. the gross carbon payment) by a smaller proportion when the 
half-life is longer. For Site 1, 42 percent and 25 percent of the value of the 
sequestered carbon is offset by debit payments within the post-harvest time horizon 
considered here, for the half-lives of zero and 50 years respectively, when r is five   9 
percent. This effect diminishes as the discount rate increases, and is negligible (ie. one 
percent or less) for both half-lives when r is 25 percent. For Site 2, these trends are 
similar. Although much of the carbon is returned to the atmosphere within 30 years of 
harvest, there is still a substantial benefit from carbon sequestration. Were the 
planning horizon extended for the analysis, a greater proportion of the sequestered 
carbon value would be offset by post-harvest emissions, and the benefit from carbon 
sequestration would be reduced. 
 
Table 3 also shows that varying the timing of debit payments has a relatively 
insignificant effect on the total profitability of the forest, particularly at high discount 
rates. Although the forest is clearly more profitable at a discount rate of 5 percent 
when H is 50 years, it remains unprofitable at discount rates of 15 and 25 percent. 
This result holds for both sites. 
Table 3. Present values of various forest components for both sites. 
Present value of various   Site 1    Site 2 
Forest components  Discount rate (%)    Discount rate (%) 
 ($1,000)   5  15  25    5  15  25 
                   
Forest product (a)  7,335  -1,671  -2,248    -340  -2,172  -2,290 
Gross carbon payment (b )  3,720  1,417  660    1,275  532  261 
               
Carbon redemption (c):                
   H = 0 years  1,557  102  8    496  32  3 
   H = 50 years  921  55  4    294  18  1 
                
Net Carbon benefit ( c b - ):               
   H=0 years  2,163  1,315  652    779  500  258 
   H=50 years  2,799  1,362  656    981  514  260 
               
Total Benefit ( c b a - + ):               
   H=0 years  9,498  -356  -1,596    439  -1,672  -2,032 
   H=50 years  10,134  -309  -1,592    641  -1,658  -2,030 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We evaluated the effect of changes in the price of carbon and the duration of the 
project on the internal rate of return of the project (timber plus carbon sequestration, 
IRRP). The model was solved for a range of carbon prices (ranging from $5/tC to 
$50/tC) and for two project lengths (20 years and 30 years). 
 
Results are presented in Table 4, for both full debit at harvest, and delayed debit 
payments. As expected, increasing the price of carbon, increases IRRP, since returns 
from carbon sequestration, and hence total profits, are higher at all discount rates. 
Increasing the project length reduces IRRP. Timber returns are lower at all discount 
rates, because the growth of the trees is relatively unchanged but the harvest is 
delayed and hence more heavily discounted. In contrast, carbon returns are higher 
because discounting has more effect on the value of the one-off redemption payment   10 
at the end of the project than on the stream of credit payments. Nevertheless, total 
project profits are lower at all discount rates. Interestingly, the results are unchanged 
for delayed debit payments, for any value of N. This result is not investigated further 
here. 
Table 4. Internal rates of return for timber plus carbon sequestration (IRRP), with full 
debit at harvest, for both sites. 
  IRRP (%) 
Project length  Site 1    Site 2 
(T, years)  Price of carbon ($/tC)    Price of carbon ($/tC) 
  5  20  50    5  20  50 
20  15  18  23    7  8  11 
30  11  14  21    5  6  10 
We also evaluated the effect of changing the duration of the project on the internal 
rate of return of timber alone (IRRW), in order to assess the sensitivity of the critical 
interval of discount rates over which carbon payments “swing the deal”. (Changing 
the price of carbon will obviously have no effect on IRRW and was therefore not 
considered). Results are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5. Internal rates of return for timber (IRRW), with full debit at harvest, for both 
sites. 
Project length  IRRW (%) 
(T, years)  Site 1    Site 2 
20  15    7 
30  10    4 
By comparing Tables 4 and 5, it is clear that increasing the project length expands the 
critical interval of discount rates over which carbon payments provide the incentive 
for the landholder to establish the forest. This effect is greater at higher carbon prices. 
For example, when carbon is $50/tC, carbon payments “swing the deal” when 
discount rates are between 15-23 percent for a 20-year project, and between 10-21 
percent for a 30-year project, for Site 1.  
Summary and conclusions 
This paper was motivated by the observations of Tomich et al. (1997) regarding the 
effect of discount rates on the profitability of an Acacia mangium system grown for 
pulp and paper products and carbon sequestration. Here we present an analysis of the 
“ideal” carbon-accounting method proposed by Cacho et al. (2003) for a Eucalypt 
forest in Australia. Our results corroborate those from Tomich et al. (1997). As 
expected, the net present value of harvested timber decreases with increasing discount 
rates (and vice versa for decreasing discount rates). However, in contrast, the net 
present value of temporary carbon sequestration increases to a maximum and then 
decreases. We also found that the value of carbon sequestration is offset by the value 
of carbon redemption, and that this effect is greatest when debits are paid in full at 
harvest, and diminishes as the discount rate increases. The results of sensitivity 
analysis indicate that the internal rate of return of the project increases with increases 
in the carbon price and decreases in the project length, and that the critical interval of   11 
discount rates over which carbon payments “swing the deal” expands with increases 
in the project length. 
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